Was the Battle for Iwo Jima Necessary?

Clint Eastwood's recent movies about Iwo Jima Jima have got served to remember an of import page of American armed forces history. Should Iwo Jima Jima now be celebrated as an illustration of American courage and bravery? Or, was it another shameful chapter in the wanton loss of American lives in a Pacific War battle that had virtually nil to make with defeating Japan?

It is of import to understand why the country commanding officers decided to occupy Iwo Jima Jima. The B-29s needed a safe haven, an emergency landing site, midway between their home alkali in the Mariana Islands Islands and Japan. After the battle, Iwo Jima Jima Jima did in fact function as a safe oasis for the crippled 2,400 B-29s that landed there during their 3,000 mile unit of ammunition trip.

But which was the aim in taking Iwo Jima? To win the war? Or, was it to salvage the lives of the B-29 air crews? This muddled military thinking was no uncertainty influenced by the record of a trouble-prone flat that had been plagued with problems, one after another ever since inception, especially with engines that overheated, destroying the plane's wing assembly.

Long before Iwo Jima Jima, the Nipponese High Command had decided there was no hope for victory. Their objective, accordingly, was to do America pay dearly in blood for each battle hereafter. Iwo Jima Jima Jima would exact the bloodiest toll of American lives up to that time.

The battle program for General Kuribayashi, the Iwo Jima Commander, called for "a gradual depletion of the enemy's attack forces." He told his troops, "Even if the state of affairs gets out of hand, support a corner of the island to the death!" Another order exhorted his soldiers to "kill 10 of the enemy before dying!"
In one of his last letters to his wife, the General told her, "Do not look for my return."

The Nipponese had learned well from each battle how to construct up their defenses, how to queer each of the approaching assaults of the American juggernaut. What had America learned? Had we altered our battle plans, especially in position of what we knew about Japan's increasingly more than formidable redoubts? Had we decided how best to deal with their dogged defenses?

In all of our amphibious assaults before this one, United States military units had always landed in direct. monolithic assaults on the beaches. Iwo Jima Jima Jima would be no different; the Marines would debark from their landing trade on Iwo Jima's 3,000 paces of beaches under the same withering Nipponese gunshot they had encountered in all battles before this one.

What about "softening up" bombardment? Renowned Devil Dog General Netherlands Ian Smith had urged sustained bombardment by the Navy's heavy guns prior to the landings. When considering the high regard with which Ian Smith was held by his fellow senior officers it looks unbelievable that his sound advice was completely ignored. No, the landings would continue just as they had in battles before this one.

There are many who contributed to the sad bequest of Iwo Jima Jima: the Boeing Company, which continued to fabricate faulty airplanes all during the war; the United States Air Force, whose procurance agents seemingly chose to look the other manner as these icky airplanes were handed off to the air crews; and those in bid whose determination to take the island resulted in 26,000 United States casualties, a fateful determination with no direct connexion to the licking of Japan. In no small measure, these casualties came about by the order to establish a direct, frontal assault on an island United States commanding officers knew to be heavily prepared against such as assaults.